

Please read the following two articles. Then write two essays (one essay per article), including:

1. Summarize the overall argument(s) of the author.
2. Discuss the evidence provided by the author for the argument(s).
3. Discuss in how far you agree or disagree with the author, and why.
4. Make sure to give yourself enough time for each essay.

I. **Drone strikes: For better or for worse?** (abridged, Farooq Yousaf, Pakistan Tribune, June 4, 2013)

“My views on drones completely changed when I accidentally tuned into a Pashto radio channel, broadcasting an interview from Fata, where a resident of Waziristan was praising the role drones played in helping his area get rid of militants. That was my first reality check as before this, I could have never imagined anyone, except the US policy makers, supporting drone strikes. This motivated me to make a thorough inquiry on this issue and ask the people around, especially students belonging to Waziristan, about their views on drone attacks.

Faizan, a student from Miranshah village of North Waziristan, who frequently visits his village, had the following opinion on the issue. “Drones infiltrate our sovereignty, which makes them something negative for our country. Yet on the other hand, our people just consider them as ‘normal’ – most call them *electronic birds*, knowing that they will only target the *Mujahideen*, and not the locals. They have a lower collateral damage compared to army operations. But, drones have also affected the locals psychologically, as most of them always remain under constant fear or threat of these drones.”

Waheed Wazir, a business graduate and a banker by profession, also comes from the same region, but shares an opposing view compared to Faizan. According to him, “Drones are an American initiative. Even though they kill many militants, they have ruined our lives. They have crippled an entire generation, community, and have inculcated fear into the minds of minors and elders. I don’t support drone attacks or the army operations as both only aim for their targets and leave their *assets*. For me a dialogue is the only solution to solving the security crisis in Pakistan.”

According to statistics issued by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, from 2004, more than 350 drone strikes have been recorded in Pakistan till date killing 2,500-3,500 people – this number includes between 400 to 900 civilian deaths. The statistics surely prove that a good number of militants have been killed in these attacks, but the civilian deaths just fuel anger against the US and this completely favours militant outfits in the region. Baitullah Mehsud, the ex-TPP head who himself died in a drone attack, explained in an interview in 2008 how drones helped their cause. “I can campaign for three months to win hearts and minds of the local population—I may get 50 or 60 people to my side, but a single drone attack brings the whole village to my side”, said Mehsud.

It is very hard to draw a clear line on drones strikes. If there are countless antagonists denouncing drones, there are also many protagonists advocating drones and boasting the results they have produced. Considering the harsh terrain of Waziristan, and a complex constellation of militants in the region, a full scale army offensive would hardly be on the cards. So, this leaves us with two options to counter the militants – drones and dialogue. As Waqas Khan Shinwari from Khyber Agency (an MS student in Peshawar) says, “First as a peaceful resident of Fata, we have never supported these militants and we feel happy after a militant is targeted through drone strikes. As compared to the army operations, these drones strikes are very effective as civilian casualties are very small in number and they have are more accurate. So far, drones have targeted a number of higher ranked Taliban leaders including second-in-chief. The only reservation against the drones I have is the national integrity of Pakistan.”

II. “Jinnah’s Pakistan” (Yaqoob Khan Bangash, Express Tribune, March 19, 2013)

Over the past few days, I have regularly heard the refrain “This is not Jinnah’s Pakistan”. Even the people protesting the events at Badami Bagh, Lahore, carried banners yearning for “Jinnah’s Pakistan”. A few months ago, the MQM was also aiming to hold a referendum, asking people if they wanted the “Taliban’s Pakistan”, or “Jinnah’s Pakistan”. Often, people with a liberal bent in Pakistan quote Jinnah’s August 11, 1947 speech and want Pakistan to be modelled on the vision presented in it. But let me tell you the bitter truth: this is Jinnah’s Pakistan!

Why? First, simply because except for the lone August 11 speech, there is nothing much in Jinnah’s utterances, which points towards a secular or even mildly religious state. The August 11, 1947 speech was a rare, only once presented, vision. No wonder then that the Government of Pakistan, through secretary general Chaudhry Mohammad Ali, initially censored the rather liberal parts of the speech. Certainly, this change of mind on Jinnah’s part was a shock for many in the Muslim League, especially since here was a person who, not so long ago, had promised Islamic rule! In his address to the Muslims of India on Eid in 1945, for example, Jinnah had noted: “Islam is not merely confined to the spiritual tenets and doctrines or rituals and ceremonies. It is a complete code regulating the whole Muslim society, every department of life, collective[ly] and individually”. Many such speeches can be quoted, which clearly indicated that Jinnah had promised a country based on Islamic principles — rather than secular ones — to the people. No surprise then that Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar pointed out in the debate over the Objectives Resolution in March 1949 that while Jinnah had made some promises to the minorities, he had also made some promises to the majority, and the introduction of an Islamic state was one of them. The debate over an Islamic system still continues.

Secondly, Jinnah was quite clear that the Muslims of India were one compact community and that their sole representative was the Muslim League. Therefore, any dissension from the Muslim League mantle meant that non-Muslim League Muslims could not even call themselves Muslims, at least politically. The best example of this closed door policy was when Jinnah insisted that the Congress could not include a Muslim member in its list of ministers (even though Maulana Azad was its president) since only the Muslim League had the right to nominate Muslims to the interim government in 1946. Thus, one of the great Muslim scholars of the 20th century, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, (and others) were prevented from joining the government. With such a control over who is a “real” Muslim (though primarily political at this juncture), it was not inconceivable that such notions would continue after independence and soon permeate the religious realm — and this is exactly what has happened.

Thirdly, Jinnah himself gave the example of undemocratic government. Not only did Jinnah preside over cabinet meetings (remember Pervez Musharraf?), one of his first acts after independence was to dismiss the popularly-elected government of Dr Khan Sahib in the then-NWFP on August 22, 1947. While it was a foregone conclusion that a League ministry would soon take over in the province, the manner in which the dismissal was done created precedence. Jinnah did not wait for the assembly itself to bring a motion of no confidence against the premier and nor did he call for new elections, both of which would have been clearly democratic and would have certainly brought in a Muslim League government. Instead, he simply got the Congress ministry dismissed and a Muslim League ministry installed — this procedural change was very significant at this early stage and set an example. Jinnah was also, extraordinarily, a minister in his own government, setting a clear precedence for future heads of state (followed by Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Ziaul Haq and Musharraf) to be very comfortable being heads of state and ministers at the same time.

Therefore, Jinnah’s Pakistan is an Islamic state, which defines who a Muslim is, excludes those Muslims it does not like and is not very democratic. Imagining it in any other way is living in a dreamland and refusing to accept the reality. However, this does not mean that Pakistan is unworkable. Pakistan might be saddled with issues of the past, but surely we can accept and solve them, if we want.”